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An increasingly complex and rapidly-evolving array of risks presents one of the greatest
challenges for decision-makers in all sectors, including the transport and tourism
industry. The prospects of an international destination can be profoundly damaged in
minutes as a result of a major outbreak of infectious disease, a natural disaster or a
terrorist incident. It is therefore vital to understand the changing nature of risk and the
ways that risks are perceived and understood, especially as people tend to respond to the
perception of risks rather than actual risks, which means that their responses are not
always rational and can even expose them to more danger.
The first part of this paper assesses the understanding of risk, and why social, cultural
and psychological factors influence the response to threat, the second part looks at the
application of this approach to tourism, and the third part sets out a model that can
capture the relevant variables for the tourism industry.
Key Words: tourism, perception, risk, understanding, management.

Part 1: The Understanding of Risk
The tourism industry is now the largest source of
employment and foreign revenue for a number of
countries, who have therefore become relatively
dependent on the industry. This means that anything
that makes people more or less likely to travel, or to
choose one destination over another, or affects the rate
of growth in the industry, tends to have immediate and
relatively widespread consequences in these countries
(Bailey, Clayton & Karagiannis, 2014 in press). This
dependency has been highlighted by a number of
disasters, including 9/11, the tsunami in South-East
Asia, Hurricane Katrina, the SARS outbreak and
others, which have exposed the extent to which tourism
is vulnerable to diverse risks (Lepp & Gibson, 2003;
Peattie, Clark & Peattie, 2005; Tsai & Chen, 2010;
Park & Reisinger, 2010; Korstanje, 2009).

respond to perceived risk (Korstanje, 2013) with regard
to the potential implications for particular industries.
The former has led to algorithms that quantify
investment risk, for example, but this has not
adequately captured the elements of human psychology
that can result in apparently irrational behaviour. This
essay therefore focuses on the latter, utilising a model
based on the conceptual desagregation of reason and

There is now a great deal of interest in identifying and
quantifying risk, but there has not yet been
commensurate attention to the ways that people
~ 48 ~

Figure 1 : Fear and Uncertainty
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perception proposed by Sunstein (2002). With regard
to the application to tourism, this model indicates that
the long-term resilience and success of a tourist
destination depends on (a) the exposure to risk, (b) the
perception of risk and (c) the ability to manage both (a)
and (b). Some destinations are more likely to be
severely impacted by adverse events because they do
not give sufficient attention to the need to both control
risks and manage the perception of risk. In some cases,
latent threats are ignored or trivialized, or external
perspectives of risk rejected as intrusive or unfair,
which can lead to disaster when threats eventually
become real.
There are also issues with regard to the limits to
knowledge and certainty, and therefore to the extent to
which some risks can be controlled, an idea which
some people find threatening in itself. Denial, however,
is rarely a wise option for decision-makers.
Risk and uncertainty
As the result of technological progress, economic
development and political reform, people around the
world are becoming healthier and living longer. It is
important to note that almost all of this progress has
been happened over the last century, which may have
created a sense among the current generation that this
kind of improvement is normal. In fact, this rate of
improvement is not „normal‟, in that it is unique to this
era, although there are many reasons for hoping and
some reasons for believing that it may last for some
time to come.
In the time of the Roman Empire, average life
expectancy for a Roman was about 20-25 years
(Rosenberg, retrieved 2014). It took two thousand
years (until 1900) for the global, average life
expectancy to increase slightly to 30 years, a rate of
improvement of less than 1 additional day of life per
year. Life expectancy then doubled over the next
century, a rate of improvement of about 110 days of
additional life per year, which means that the rate of
improvement suddenly increased over 100-fold. By
2012 the world average life expectancy at birth was 70
years (World Health Organization Global Health
Observatory, retrieved 2014), and is approaching 90 in
a few countries. This extraordinary surge in life
expectancy was the result of improvements in
agriculture and food supply systems, water and
sanitation, medicine and health care, and increases in
productivity which made it possible to generate enough
wealth to support a far higher population. This means
that people born today have a lower risk of premature
death than any previous generation in history.
~ 49 ~

However, there are now some serious potential
problems that could disrupt this progress. For example,
The Global Trends 2030 report by the US National
Intelligence Council notes that world demand for food,
water, and energy will grow by approximately 35%,
40%, and 50% respectively by 2030, due to the
increase in global population and rising per capita
consumption, while climate change will create
instability in many regions by contributing to water
and food shortages (retrieved 2014). The combination
of rising demand for food, energy, water and other
resources, environmental degradation, climate change
and the associated impacts on agricultural systems and
livelihoods, in conjunction with poverty,
unemployment, crime, corruption and failures of
governance, could increase the incidence of violent
conflicts in many regions in future if these problems
are not resolved.
So average exposure to risk has been falling for
decades, but the possibility of a future increase in risk
appears to be rising. This means that the quality of life
available to the next generation may, unusually, be
lower than today.
There are several dimensions to this challenge that
require further analysis. The degree of exposure to
these risks varies between regions, nations and
generations, as does the flow of benefits from the
current status quo, and the fact that the risks are
unequally distributed greatly complicates the search for
solutions. For example, China is by far the world‟s
largest carbon emitter, but the Government of China
does not want to incur the risk of reduced rates of
economic growth and of losing domestic support by
imposing the additional cost of carbon reduction
measures, so has effectively traded its immediate
domestic political and economic risk against the longterm damage that may be caused by climate change.
There are also important differences in attitudes to
uncertainty. For example, the World Bank Turn Down
the Heat report (2012, retrieved 2014) notes that the
world average surface temperature has now risen by
almost 1C, that an increase of 3 or 3.5C by 2100 is
now considered „probable‟, and that there may be
„catastrophic consequences‟ if there is a 4C rise, with
some parts of the world becoming effectively
uninhabitable. However, there are also projections
(from Bloomberg New Energy Finance, retrieved
2014) indicating that fossil fuel use will peak by 2030
as the result of the rapid displacement of fossil fuels
with cheap, efficient solar cells, which would certainly
avert some of the worst consequences of climate
change.
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Neither outcome is certain; they are both possible
future scenarios. The former projection assumes that
most energy will continue to be sourced from fossil
fuels; the latter projection assumes technological
substitution. Which projection proves to be more
accurate will depend on many variables, including the
rate of technological innovation and uptake, demand,
and governmental intervention in the market place,
amongst others. So the issue is whether indeterminacy
is seen as a justification for more vigorous action (to
avert the worst-case outcome) or inaction (as the
problem will eventually resolve itself as a result of
technological advances). The stance that individuals
take with regard to uncertainties of this kind tends to
depend on a range of psychological and cultural
factors, including their optimism or pessimism about
the future, and their beliefs, particularly with regard to
factors such as the importance of freedom and whether
there are limits to growth.
In addition, as Clayton and Radcliffe (1996) note, each
possible outcome is usually attended by a different
distribution of risk, that is, by a different distribution of
costs and benefits. This means that there are both
technical and political considerations in any analysis of
probability and risk. For example, a small risk of a
major disaster (a 0.01% chance of an incident that
would kill 10,000 people), and a larger risk of a smaller
disaster (a 100% chance of an incident that would kill
one person), give rise to the same expected outcome in
terms of losses (1 statistical life), provided that the risk
estimates are accurate. Despite this, the characteristics
of the two outcomes are very different, and people are
sensibly concerned about the distribution of such risks.
There is no „correct‟ way of choosing between such
risks; the crux of the debate is about the acceptability
of particular distributions of risk. As these examples
suggest, most debates about progress, development and
the environment ultimately resolve into different
perceptions and responses to risk, which are in turn
influenced by cultural values (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1983). The relationship between culture, perception,
risks and consequences is therefore the subject of this
paper.
The perception of risk
The way that people perceive and respond to risk is
partly culturally-mediated. For example, after the 9/11
terrorist incident in 2001, many US citizens were more
reluctant to fly, because they feared being the victims
of the next terrorist incident. However, they did not
stop travelling, but would drive rather than take a
domestic flight. This is likely to have increased the
death toll significantly, as flying is much safer than
~ 50 ~

driving in terms of deaths/passenger/kilometre
(Korstanje and Clayton, 2012). About 44,000 people
die annually in car accidents in the USA, while about
200 die in aircraft accidents (in fact, flying is safer than
bathing, as some 325 US citizens drown in their bath
each year).
So, as a result of choosing to drive instead of flying, it
is likely that about 1,595 additional people died in car
accidents. As 2,976 people died during the 9/11 attack
itself, the number of fatalities in the USA caused by
9/11 is likely to have been increased by over 50% by
the consequent deaths on the roads. As this example
illustrates, sometimes the actions that people take in
response to a perceived threat actually increase their
exposure to risk, mainly because of the way that most
people act on the basis of their beliefs and perceptions,
rather than reality.
Today, many US citizens still greatly over-estimate the
threat of terrorism, and underestimate other risks; in
particular, those associated with their lifestyles. As
Zakaria (2013, retrieved 2014) notes, between 2001
and 2013, foreign-inspired terrorism claimed about two
dozen lives in the USA (an average of two per year).
Over the same period, over 100,000 Americans were
killed in gun homicides (about 8,340 per year), and
over 400,000 were killed in motor-vehicle accidents
(about 33,340 per year). These were minor threats,
however, in comparison to physical inactivity and poor
nutrition (diets high in sugar, fat and salt), which cause
310,000-580,000 deaths in the USA every year, similar
to the number of deaths caused by tobacco. So an
overweight smoker with a bad diet is roughly half a
million times more likely to die as a result of their
lifestyle choices than as a result of terrorism, and yet
may be far more worried that their next flight will be
hijacked by terrorists.
There are also people who live on the slopes of active
volcanoes, on unstable slopes, in areas liable to
flooding and in other hazardous areas, or work in
dangerous occupations. Some of the people in these
circumstances are not fully aware of the risks, some
have fatalistic attitudes or religious faith to help them
cope, and some are in denial. For example, when
Mount Vesuvius erupted in AD 79 it destroyed two
cities and killed about 16,000 people. It has erupted
many times since then, most recently in 1944. Today,
some three million people live on its lower slopes,
mostly in the city of Naples, which lies just 9km west
of the volcano. Some of them believe that the volcano
will not erupt again in their lifetime, or that there will
be sufficient warning for them to escape. For some,
however, this may not be true.
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The perceived fairness of balance between risk and
reward is also a factor. For example, most people will
rate a situation as being significantly more risky if their
exposure to the risk is not voluntary, if children are
exposed to the risk, or if the situation is not perceived
as fair, that is, if the benefits accrue to one person and
the risks to another. Clayton and Radcliffe (1996) note
that many people in the USA rated their exposure to
the agrochemical Alar, which was sprayed on apples,
as being significantly more risky than drinking highroast coffee, even though both contain potential
carcinogens and the latter activity is arguably the more
dangerous. Exposure to Alar was widely perceived as a
high risk partly because children were exposed to the
risk, because the exposure was not undertaken
knowingly or voluntarily, and because the benefits of
spraying accrued to the producers and retailers while
the consumers accrued the risks. In this case, the apples
were slightly cheaper as a result of the use of Alar, but
this was not seen as adequate compensation by the
consumers concerned.
The perception of control
The perception of control is also a factor. In the
example given earlier, people preferred to drive rather
than fly because they felt that they were in control of
their car, but would not be in control of a situation on
board a hijacked aircraft. This perception of control is
largely illusory, of course, as the safety of every driver
depends on the alertness, competence and sobriety of
other road users, and accidents involving tired or
intoxicated drivers are far more common than terrorist
incidents.
As these examples suggest, the relationship between
actual risk, the perception of risk and any consequent
change in behaviour is influenced by a number of
variables, including the level of understanding of the
situation and of probabilities, personal attitude to risk
and cultural factors. These variables largely determine
which risks are recognized, and which are not, and
which risks are magnified, and which are underestimated. Even awareness of risk does not always
translate into risk-minimizing strategies; it can also
result in belief systems that allow people to live with
risk by creating a sense that the risk can be ignored or
placated. So, perceptions can profoundly influence
behaviour, life styles and expectations. It is clear,
therefore, that social and psychological factors are
highly important considerations when translating
technical assessments of risk into terms of everyday
language and experience, and when formulating
procedures for controlling risks in the domain of public
policy.
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The discrepancy between perception and reality of
exposure to risk is relatively easy to understand with
regard to individuals, but the same mismatch can also
be true of institutional responses. For example, as
Balko (2013) points out, civil disturbances of the
1960s followed by the „war on drugs‟ led to the
introduction of paramilitary tactics by police officers in
the USA; partly to ensure their own safety and partly to
protect the communities they serve. In the mid-1980s
less than half of large cities in the USA (over 50,000
population) and just 20% of small cities (below 50,000
population) had Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
teams, but today it is has risen to almost 90% of the
large cities and 80% of the small cities. The SWAT
teams are also deployed far more frequently; SWAT
teams were deployed in the USA about 3,000 times in
1980, but are now used about 50,000 times each year.
This is largely because they were previously reserved
for situations where there was a high risk of violence,
but they are now routinely used on many deployments
where there is relatively little risk of resistance
(including breaking up illegal poker games and raiding
bars suspected of serving alcohol to under-age
drinkers). So there are now far more SWAT teams,
they are more heavily armed, and they are used far
more frequently.
This militarization of police forces in the USA has
resulted in a number of unwanted consequences. One
of them is over-spending on equipment; a recent article
in The Economist gave the example of Fargo, North
Dakota, where the police force now has an armoured
personnel carrier, even though the city averages less
than two homides a year. The more fundamental
paradox, however, is that levels of violent crime have
been falling in most US cities for several decades, so
the militarization of policing is no longer related to the
level of threat, and has actually made many citizens
less safe than they were before, as more aggressive
tactics are now routinely used by many police forces.
As the same article in The Economist also reports, a
number of minor confrontations have rapidly escalated
to the unnecessary use of lethal force by paramilitary
police officers. So measures originally taken to protect
citizens can now result in an increased threat.
The extension of security and surveillance also
represents an attempt to increase knowledge and
control of the situation. There has been an enormous
investment in security and surveillance systems since
9/11, but the same event also changed the context of
security. In medieval Europe, for example, walls
protected cities, and travelers were at risk while in
transit. Today, the enemy can be anywhere, including
inside the city, which raises new challenges for those

International Journal of Religious Tourism and Pilgrimage

Volume 2(i), 2014

who must monitor the movement of terrorists and
criminals while still allowing the free passage of those
on legitimate business or leisure pursuits. Bauman
(2013) suggests that the state has conceded some
power to protect their citizens because of the
importance of travel and trade, and also that the
modern state is now obliged to provide solutions for
problems created elsewhere. The security forces in the
UK, for example, must now deal with radicalized
young Muslims born in the UK, but who identify with
ideological struggles in countries such as Syria. The
technologies of security and surveillance have
developed partly to address these more complex and
fluid problems, but also partly in order to offer citizens
an apparent (but usually only temporary) solution.
Situating risk
Risk usually implies a situation of potential danger,
which is partly (as shown above) socially defined. The
risk is not „real‟, as it has not happened yet; it is a
possible future condition. For example, earthquakes are
far more likely to happen in seismically active areas,
but their timing cannot usually be predicted with
precision. If one does not expect an earthquake for
another century, it is quite rational to build a house in
the area, but if one believes that an earthquake is
imminent, it would be more rational to move away.
Similarly, New Orleans was devastated by Hurricane
Katrina in 2005, and many of the former inhabitants
still want to return there. The decision to return to New
Orleans depends, in part, on an assessment of the
future, i.e. on whether one expects another hurricane to
happen in a relatively short time. When the event
actually happens, of course, „risk‟ is replaced by reality
(Douglas & Wildavski, 1983; Douglas, 1992). This is
the way that insurance policies work; insurance cannot
be bought after the disaster has happened.

might seem like an acceptably low risk. However, if
10,000 people cross the same road every day, then, on
average, 10 people will be hit by a car every day.
Similarly, if there is a 1/300 risk of a serious accident
at a nuclear power plant in any given year, then that
might be expressed as one serious accident, on
average, every 300 years. That might seem like an
acceptably low risk. If, however, there are 300 nuclear
power stations in the world, then, on average, there
will be one serious accident every year. So it is
important to take both risk and exposure into account.
Similarly, when a risk is expressed as a „one in a
hundred year event‟, many people assume that that
means that the event will not happen for a century – or,
if it does happen, that it won‟t happen again for a
hundred years. Neither of these interpretations is
correct; a „one in a hundred year event‟ means that
each year there is a 1% chance that the event will
happen.[1] So it is just as likely to happen in year 1 as
in any other year. It is also important to note that the
probability remains the same, even when the event
happens. For example, if the event actually happens in
year 5, then the probability of it happening again in
year 6 is still 1%.[2]

Risks are the combination of two factors; the chance
that a particular event will happen to a person (or a
business, or a country), and the number of times (or the
length of time) that the person is exposed to that risk.
If, for example, there is a 1/1000 chance of a person
being hit by a car when crossing a busy road, that

The perception of risk is not necessarily the same as
statistical risk; it tends to vary by context and between
individuals. In a country with a high homicide rate,
personal safety should be a matter of concern to all
citizens. However, most people take threats more
seriously when they believe themselves or their
families to be directly exposed to the risk, so will
effectively assign a lower value to a stranger being
murdered further away. The killing of a friend,
relative, acquaintance or neighbour is far more directly
and personally threatening. In almost every country
with high levels of violent crime, the violence is
usually concentrated in particular areas, so that
perpetrators are also likely to be victims. This means
that the majority of the population is more concerned,
in practice, with the distribution of the homicides than
with the total; people living in areas with relatively low
levels of violence may not feel that they are exposed to
undue personal risk.

1 Risks are usually expressed as percentages, or on a scale
of zero (impossible) to one (certain). So an extremely
low risk has a probability close to zero, while a threat
that is already present would have a probability of 1, or
100%.
2 This is true unless the event actually does make it less
likely to happen again. For example, an earthquake
might relieve the strain on a fault, so that the chance of
another earthquake is then lower than before.

Some of the most serious risks, however, are beyond
the control not just of individuals, but of any one
nation. For example, some of the significant sources of
global risk today are located in under-developing,
rogue and failed states, including conflicts based on
religious fundamentalism, political and narcoterrorism, and international crime (including moneylaundering, cybercrime and the trafficking of people,
weapons and narcotics), and the increasing flows of
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political, economic and environmental migrants and
refugees. Other risks include increasing antibiotic
resistance in the bacteria that cause some of the major
diseases, and the rapid international transmission of
highly infectious diseases via main transport routes.
These problems cannot be contained in their countries
and regions of origin, and therefore now have global
consequences.
These are real threats. However, their impact on the
public can be compounded by rapid global reporting of
threats, attacks, natural disasters and major accidents,
missing aircraft and other calamities, which can give a
false sense of their prevalence, as any sufficiently
shocking event caused by factors that are beyond one‟s
personal control can result in a sense of powerlessness
and risk.
So, part of the public‟s sense of risk is irrational, in that
natural disasters have occurred before and will
continue to occur in future, so the only change is that
they are now almost certain to be reported. The actual
exposure to risk has not increased. However, part of
the perception of increased risk is justified. Some
developments, such as climate change or conflicts over
resources or ideologies, could indeed make the world a
more dangerous place, with consequences impacting
on lives far from the original source.
The politics of risk
Durodié (retrieved 2014), in an analysis of the threat to
the West posed by al-Qaeda, points out that the number
of terrorist incidents has been going down, that most of
them now are not in the West, but in places such as
Kashmir, and that the threat to citizens in Europe today
is minute compared to the second world war, when
millions died. For example, the 7/7 bombings in
London on the 7 July 2005 killed 52 civilians and
injured over 700 more, which was the UK‟s worst
terrorist incident since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing.
By contrast, there were over 600,000 people killed in
the UK in 1937 as a result of bombing by the
Luftwaffe.
This suggests that part of the reaction to terrorism is
mediated by the perception of threat, which can be
easily exaggerated by the media. This can also be
exaggerated for political purposes; Durodié points out
that polititical or religious leaders can then offer to
restore stability and safety, sometimes using that to
gain power. The danger here, of course, is that they can
then direct people‟s fear at identifiable enemies, who
may be a different ethnic or religious group, and some
of the most horrific civil wars and genocides have
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stemmed from the identification of one group as the
enemy, as people will then go and slaughter their
former neighbours in order to remove the „threat‟.
One way in which the media can play a role in
magnifying the sense of threat is simply in reporting
what is considered newsworthy. Reports of terrorist
incidents are usually given far more prominence than
reports of bad diets, even though bad diets actually kill
far more people. Few people understand probability, or
their exposure to a given risk, and so will over-react to
events that appear to be uncontrollable (such as a
random attack), and under-react to events that seem
mundane and under their personal control (such as the
consumption of cigarettes, sugar and cheeseburgers).
This cognitive bias means that perception is not usually
a good basis for important national decisions. As
Sunstein (2002) points out, states should not echo the
claims of their citizenry. Whenever alternatives are not
properly evaluated by experts, unwise policies may
actually engender new risks.
More generally, the role of the state in identifying risk
and developing strategies to manage risk is now one of
the factors that define particular nations and cultures.
For example, Beck (2006) argues that some of the core
institutions (such as educational, political and
economic structures) that regulated social life are now
in decline. Banks are no longer pillars of respectability
and stability; politics is about expediency and
management rather than ideology; online educational
systems are replacing teachers. Risk, however, has
become a common mediator (like money) that
connects people. Beck suggests that without the need
to manage risk, societies would disintegrate, while
Giddens (1991) argues that even the concept of the
future is inextricably intertwined with concepts of risk.
This idea is supported by Douglas & Aaron Wildawsky
(1983), who argue that risks have to be considered, at
least in part, as cultural legacies, which suggests that
one of the more important defining features of each
society is their beliefs and fears. The recent Russian
annexation of the Crimea, for example,
incomprehensible behaviour to European governments,
makes more sense when the resentments and fears of
the current Russian elite are taken into account.
Similarly, the low demand for travel insurance in
Argentina, in comparison to the USA, reflects not just
different risk profiles but also a different cultural
understanding and acceptance of particular types of
risk. As the 9/11 example above indicated, Americans
feel safer when they are in control of the vehicle, even
when the opposite is true.
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In conclusion, although almost all authors on the
subject of risk agree on the need to take cultural and
behavioural factors into account, it is important to
develop a more systematic methodology and typology
for assessing and categorizing the influence of cultural
variables on attitudes to risk and the associated patterns
of behaviour.
The role of media
The media and cultural industries have always played
an important role in shaping the public reaction to
threats.
The shock many US citizens felt at the events of
9/11 led to a national debate about what it
means to be American individually, nationally
and internationally, and the terms of this debate
were primarily moral. For US citizens, this
debate was not just about what we ought to do
in response to 9/11, it was about how our
responses to 9/11 morally configure us (Weber,
2006: 4).
Wars create a moral narrative about good and evil. The
media tend to focus on a few significant aspects
including who we are and who we are not (i.e. defining
„us‟ and „them‟), and what we might become (i.e. what
we have to do in response to an attack). For example,
Korstanje and Olsen (2011) argue that the media
shapes an ideological discourse which demonizes some
people while over-valorizing others. Some acts of
heroism may also be misappropriated. For example, the
film U-571 (released in 2000) showed a German
submarine being boarded in 1942 by United States
Navy submariners in order to capture an Enigma cipher
machine. In fact, it was British personnel from HMS
Bulldog who first captured a naval Enigma machine
from German submarine U-110 in the North Atlantic in
May 1941, months before the United States had even
entered the war. So an act of genuine heroism by
British sailors was appropriated and used to show an
apparent act of American heroism, which supports a
commonly used narrative of the need for American
intervention to save others.

Risk and the Implications for Tourism
The psychological impact of the 9/11 event affected
tourism flows around the world. The 9/11 incident had
such an extensive impact partly because the terrorists
used hijacked aircraft, so that all forms of air travel
were suddenly perceived to be much more dangerous.
Some countries lost over 20% of their tourism arrivals,
but others gained as tourists switched to destinations
~ 54 ~

that were perceived to be safer, as terrorism has a
particularly significant effect on the way that tourists
perceive the relative safety of destinations (Peattie,
Clarke & Peattie, 2005).
The 9/11 incident also demonstrated a new-found
ability to use media to amplify the effects of a
„spectacular‟ attack; the targets and the timing were all
chosen to ensure that the message would be seen
around the world. Both the media impact and the
creation of „winners‟ and „losers‟ in the economicallyvital tourism industry served to create fear and
division. As this suggests, although the tourism and
hospitality industry have devoted considerable effort to
mitigate negative threats so that their destinations are
not affected, the way that the media portray a crisis or
a disaster will undoubtedly impact the local economy.
A murder that is reported as an isolated event, for
example, is unlikely to have a significant economic
effect on a destination, but a murder that is portrayed
as part of a pattern in which visitors are targeted
probably will.
Who is at risk?
Korstanje (2009) argues that tourist risk is almost
always defined in terms of those aspects which may
jeopardize the well-being of tourists, based on the idea
that vulnerability and a lack of familiarity make
tourists easy prey for crime and terrorist attacks, and
the idea that the tourism-dependent economies rely
heavily on their image as destinations, and so are more
vulnerable to the repercussions of attacks (Korstanje,
2010 and 2011).
It is true, of course, that tourists can be more at risk
than locals, mainly because they are unfamiliar with
the local terrain and customs, and may be instantly
recognizeable as both strangers and relatively wealthy
potential targets (See Figure 2). The Bali nightclub
bombing in 2003, for example, was used to create fear
and anger in the victims‟ countries of origin, and also
to undermine the local citizenry‟s trust in the state.
West (2008) notes that this event is usually portrayed
in Australia as an archetypical act of terrorism
comparable with the 9/11 event.
The media narrative of terrorist incidents of this kind
typically emphasizes that foreign tourists were
targeted. This may be true of the specific incident, but
can still give a very misleading impression, as the great
majority of victims of Jihadist terrorists, for example,
are actually Muslims living in the countries where the
terrorists are active.
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Some destinations actually combine risk aversion with
risk attraction factors. As Lepp and Gibson (2008) put
it, the industry is circumscribed by two contrasting
tendencies, the sensation- or novelty-seeking risk, and
risk aversion, so the personality of tourists plays a
crucial role determining the perception of risk. Tourism
involves a tension between security and curiosity (the
wish to explore and find new experiences) (George,
Inbakaran & Poyyamoli, 2010). Naturally, individuals
vary in terms of their tolerance for risk (Dolnicar,
2005), but some will seek out riskier experiences and
destinations.

and give the public the
result in the destination
costs as people could
elsewhere. In this regard,
important:

necessary reassurance may
incurring serious economic
still take their business
three factors are particularly

The extent of control
The probability of repetition
The status of victims.

Tourism Risk Model

The extent of control refers to the actual and perceived
effectiveness of the intelligence and security
professionals, and their ability to anticipate and
prevent attacks.

Internal tourism risks are here defined as any threat or
danger generated by the functioning of the tourism
industry itself, while external risks are those imposed
from outside the industry. Internal risks can be further
subdivided into:

The probability of repetition refers to the probability
that the event will recur (i.e. if the ability to plan
effectively and mobilize resources to increase
resilience to further traumatic events is clearly
lacking).
The status of victims and their nationality will have a
significant effect on the extent of the social/media
impact of an event. For example, the murder of an
American tourist in Mexico will typically get far
more coverage in the USA than the murder of a
Mexican. In terms of media coverage, therefore,
one American may be „worth‟ thousands of local
people, whose deaths are usually reported as
statistics, rather than individual cases. Similarly, the
killing of children, pregnant women or disabled
people usually provokes a much stronger emotional
response. Terrorists know this, of course, and so
may attack tourists specifically in order to get more
media coverage in the tourist‟s home nation and
therefore inflict more economic damage. The
degree of economic dependency on tourism in

Risk associated with the service.
Risks to the security of the tourist.
The former includes relatively mundane factors, such
as delayed flights, booking errors, lost luggage and so
on. The latter is far more serious, with potential
implications for lives, the image of the mode of
transport (in the case of a hijacking or bombing at an
airport) or tourist destination, and even the entire
tourist system. This category includes:
Virus outbreaks, pandemics.
Terrorist attacks, especially those against civilians.
Serious mass poisonings
contaminated food or water.

associated

with

Major road, rail or aircraft accidents.

Figure 2 – Coffin of French Tourist Assassinated
in Argentina

Large-scale natural and other disasters
Frequent incidents of murder, rape, assaults, thefts.
Violent political conflict, civil unrest.
As noted earlier, any model to identify and manage risk
in the tourism sector has to take into account two
variables:
The actual probability of a dangerous event.
The psychological effect on the public.
Efficient risk management plans have to address both
the real risk, and also the public perception of the risk.
The latter may be inaccurate, but failure to address it

http://www.lapatilla.com/site/2011/08/05/las-mejores-fotos-del
-jueves-4-de-agosto/the-coffin-of-murdered-french-touristcassandre-bouvier-is-loaded-into-an-undertakers-vehicle-insalta/
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developing countries is therefore an important
factor when trying to predict where tourists might
be the targets for terrorist violence.
These factors can be arrayed as outlined in Table 1.
Paradoxically, when there is a high probability
of repetition, the impact may actually reduce over time
as the audience becomes inured to the event and its
original impact gradually fades.
Any incident that is overwhelming in scale (such as the
Asian tsunami) or a deliberate atrocity (such as an act
of terrorism) invokes fears of powerlessness, especially
when nation states appear unable to prevent these
events, respond to them appropriately or reduce the
likelihood of their recurrence. This will tend to
maximise the social and media impact. If the state is
able to act decisively, and can give – and guarantee –
the necessary reassurances – then the fear will usually
be mitigated. Current risk perception research is mostly
limited to the impact on tourists, which means that the
explanations are typically partial and largely
descriptive. In order to advance our understanding of
the options for risk management, it is important to take
into account both actual risks and reactions to risk, the
impact on both locals and non-locals, and both the
event and the role that the media play in portraying the
event.

Conclusion
This paper argues that risk assessment and
management has to include both actual risks and the
psychological and cultural factors involved in
mediating the perception, understanding and response
to risk. Three factors are of particular importance when
assessing the effects of risks on human behaviour; the
extent of control, the probability of repetition and the
status of the victims. With regard to the application to
tourism, this model indicates that the long-term
resilience and success of a tourist destination depends
on (a) the exposure to risk, (b) the perception of risk
and (c) the ability to manage both (a) and (b). Some
destinations are more likely to be severely impacted by
adverse events because they do not give sufficient
attention to the need to both control risks and manage
the perception of risk. In some cases, latent threats are
ignored or trivialized, or external perspectives of risk
rejected as intrusive or unfair, which can lead to
disaster when threats eventually become real. In an era
when events are rapidly reported around the world,
causing a cascade of consequences, all policy-makers
must understand the importance of creating
comprehensive risk-management plans.

Table 1 : Risks to the Security of the Tourist
Risk type

Control

Probability of
Repetition

Victims

Impact

Virus outbreak

Low in vulnerable
countries

Low in the most
vulnerable countries

Anyone exposed, so
depends on vector.

High

Terrorism

Low in vulnerable
countries

High

Locals and/or tourists
may be the primary
target

High

Contaminated Food

Moderate to high,
depending on the
quality of control

Low in countries that
respond
appropriately, high in
countries that don’t

Typically tourists

Low to moderate,
depending on
numbers affected and
reportage

Accidents

Moderate to high,
depending on the
quality of control

Low in countries that
respond
appropriately, high in
countries that don’t

Anyone in the affected
area, more likely to be
local in the case of e.g.
industrial accidents

Low, typically shortterm

Natural Disasters

Low

High, but periodicity
may be low

Anyone in the area

High for severe
disasters

Theft

Low in the most
vulnerable countries

High

Locals and tourists;
tourists may be
targeted

Low, unless common
and/or accompanied
by violence

Homicide

Low in the most
vulnerable countries

High

Locals and tourists

High, if frequent and/
or tourists targeted
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